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Non-routine tasks, restructuring of firms, and wage inequality
within and between skill-groups
Abstract
This paper argues that endogenous restructuring processes within firms towards analytical and
interactive non-routine tasks (like problem-solving and organizational activities, respectively), triggered
by advances in information and communication technologies (ICT) and rising supply of educated
workers, are associated with an increase of wage inequality within education groups. We show that this
may be accompanied by a decline or stagnation of between-group wage dispersion. The mechanisms
proposed in this research are not only consistent with the evolution of the distribution of wages in
advanced countries, but also with the evolution of task composition in firms and a frequently confirmed
complementarity between skill-upgrading, new technologies and knowledge-based work organization.
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1 Introduction
The dramatic changes in the distribution of wages in many advanced countries during
the last few decades have stimulated an intensive debate in economic research. Most
of the literature has focussed on a rise in wage inequality between education groups.1
Interestingly, however, an increase in the college premium has been largely conÞned
to the US and UK (from the 1980s onwards until recently), whereas inequality within
education groups (sometimes referred to as residual wage inequality) has risen substan-
tially also in other advanced countries (see e.g. Fitzenberger, 1999, and Fitzenberger
et al., 2001, for Germany).2 Moreover, most empirical studies conclude that even for
the US the rise in within-group wage inequality accounts for more than half of the rise
in total wage inequality (e.g. Juhn et al., 1993; Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; Katz
and Autor, 1999).
In the Þrst theoretical contribution which focuses on within-group wage inequality,
Galor and Moav (2000) argue that an increase in the rate of technological progress,
by adversely aﬀecting the relative productivity of low-skilled labor, raises educational
attainment of workers with relatively low learning abilities. As a result, wage inequal-
ity within skilled and unskilled labor increases, in addition to rising between-group
inequality. Gould et al. (2001) oﬀer an alternative explanation for rising residual wage
inequality by arguing that increasing uncertainty in the rate of technological change
across sectors disproportionately aﬀects the learning requirements of unskilled labor,
thereby raising demand for education as insurance. In a similar vein, Aghion (2002)
and Aghion et al. (2002) argue that within-group wage inequality rises with the speed
of diﬀusion of new general purpose technologies, by showing that inequality may arise
even among (with respect to their abilities) identical workers with diﬀerent opportuni-
ties to adapt to the most recent vintages of machines.
1For a comprehensive survey of the literature on the evolution of the distribution of wages and
explanations related to technology changes, see Acemoglu (2002). Other explanations focus on trade-
related factors (e.g. Das, 2001, 2003) and institutional factors (e.g. Fortin and Lemieux, 1997).
2In Germany, wage dispersion within education groups has considerably increased among medium-
educated and high-educated workers, whereas remaining fairly stable among the low-skilled (Fitzen-
berger, 1999, and Fitzenberger et al., 2001).
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In contrast, this paper argues that endogenous restructuring processes within Þrms
towards analytical and interactive non-routine tasks (like problem-solving and organi-
zational activities, respectively), triggered by advances in information and communi-
cation technologies (ICT) and rising supply of educated workers, are associated with
rising wage inequality within education groups. Moreover, we show that, at the same
time, between-group wage dispersion may fall, as especially observed in Continental
Europe.
Our goal is to provide a theory based on the behavioral response of Þrms in adapt-
ing to changes in technology and factor supply conditions.3 The proposed framework is
designed to shed light on the microeconomic underlying forces for changes in the wage
distribution within and across education groups. The model rests on the following
hypotheses. First, reallocating production workers from routine to non-routine tasks
is productivity-enhancing, but requires a larger degree of (informal) training by non-
production workers (encompassing support and supervision tasks). For instance,
this includes the regular updating of workers about changes in work procedures, the
organizational structure and employers goals. Second, non-routine tasks require a
wider spectrum of abilities − like analytical skills, adaptability to new environments,
management skills, the ability to communicate with coworkers (and other social skills)
− than routine tasks. For instance, autonomous decision-making and problem-solving
presumes interaction among workers, performance and coordination of multiple tasks
and the need to gather relevant information from co-workers (e.g. Lindbeck and Snower,
1996, 2000). Moreover, providing support and information to production workers itself
requires social skills of non-production workers. Abilities to perform these tasks eﬀec-
tively are typically unobservable for empirical researchers, and are possibly unrelated
to formal education levels, thus providing a natural ingredient for a theory of residual
inequality. Third, we hypothesize that non-production (e.g., organizational) activities
are intensive in educated labor.
3We signiÞcantly extend our earlier framework (Egger and Grossmann, 2005), which does not allow
for heterogeneity of workers within education groups.
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The idea of the present paper is to propose a uniÞed framework which identiÞes
mechanisms for the decision by Þrms how to allocate workers to routine and non-routine
tasks, and thereby to utilize analytical and social abilities of workers. Endogenizing the
allocation of workers into routine and non-routine tasks and taking into account their
connection to unobservable abilities allows us to address within-group wage inequality
as found in standard estimations of Mincer equations. Distinguishing, in addition,
between education levels serves to examine the interaction between within-group and
between-group wage inequality in a model with endogenous task composition.
As an immediate consequence of taking into account within-group and between-
group heterogeneity of workers as well as the heterogeneity of tasks in a uniÞed frame-
work, however, the analysis becomes quite complex. But in our view, these cost in
terms of exposition has to be weighted against the beneÞt of obtaining an (admittedly
still very stylized) theory in which not only the outcome (wage inequality) but also
the mechanism (restructuring and task composition) is empirically testable. In other
words, the advantage of our approach is to bring light into the black box of production
process.
In the next section we discuss supporting evidence of our analysis on the evolution
of task composition in Þrms and a frequently conÞrmed complementarity between skill-
upgrading, new technologies and knowledge-based work organization. Section 3 sets up
the model. Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium and provides comparative-static results.
Section 5 summarizes and brießy argues that our model may shed light into the diﬀer-
ences in the evolution of wage inequality patterns between the U.S. and Continental
Europe. All proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2 Evidence on Task Composition and Training
As argued above, the goal of our analysis is to simultaneously address wage inequality
within and between education groups together with observed restructuring of Þrms
towards non-routine tasks.
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A growing body of empirical evidence attempts to obtain insight into the nature
of the apparent skill-biased technological change in the developed world. For in-
stance, autonomous problem-solving and assignment of more responsibility to workers
have been major innovations in work organization practices (e.g. OECD, 1999, ch.
4). Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) and Bresnahan et al. (2002) for the U.S. and Falk
(2002) for Germany Þnd a strong positive relationship between computerization, orga-
nizational change and training provision. Moreover, evidence by Autor et al. (2003)
for the U.S. and Spitz (2004) for West Germany suggests that computerization has
caused a signiÞcant shift in the job composition from routine to non-routine tasks.4
Their results lend considerable support for the hypothesis that computer technology
is complementary to workers with relatively high analytical and interactive abilities.
Consistent with these kinds of evidence, our model suggests that ICT has induced
Þrms to incur training expenditures to restructure towards non-routine tasks, and that
this restructuring favors workers with analytical and social skills.5 It is important to
note that this seems to concern all education levels. For instance, Spitz (2004, Tab.
6) Þnds that between 1979 and 1998/9 the share of analytical and interactive tasks
have increased even for low-educated workers from 7.6 to 21.4 percent. For medium-
educated and high-educated workers, the change has been from 12.8 to 40.2 percent
and from 35.6 to 73 percent, respectively. Apart from the role of ICT, Caroli and van
Reenen (2001) present evidence from both France and UK which is consistent with the
impact of an increase in the educated workforce in our model. Their Þndings suggest a
strongly positive eﬀect of changes in the relative supply of skilled labor (proxied by re-
gional skill price diﬀerentials) on restructuring of Þrms towards such knowledge-based
organizational forms. Finally, Gould (2002) provides evidence on a surge of the demand
4As a consequence, the employment share of workers in routine tasks like administrative work and
mere machine operating has dramatically declined over the last decades in favor of managing and
professional tasks (e.g. Berman et al., 1994; Bresnahan, 1999; Falkinger and Grossmann, 2003).
5It is interesting to note that the required nature of training seem to have changed along with
this kind of restructuring. For instance, Barron et al. (1999) Þnd for a random sample of 3600 US
businesses from the Comprehensive Business Database in 1992 that the average time a worker is in
informal management training is threefold the time she is in formal training, and that oﬀ-site
training programs are by far less important than on-site training in the Þrm.
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for general skills like analytical and social abilities within all broad occupations, along
with rising residual wage inequality.
3 The Model
We suppose that individual skills diﬀer in two dimensions: Þrst, in formal education lev-
els and, second, in abilities like adaptability to new environments as well as analytical,
management and social (e.g. communication) skills, which are typically unobservable
for empirical researchers.
Formally, suppose that there are two types of education levels, highly educated
(H−) and less educated (L−) labor. Both are inelastically supplied in segmented and
perfect labor markets. Labor supply is denoted by H and L, respectively.6 To allow
for within-group heterogeneity, e.g., capturing individual diﬀerences in analytical and
social skills, Þrst, let L−individuals diﬀer in ability β ∈ B = {β1, ..., βK}, 0 ≤ β1 <
... < βK <∞. The supply of type β is denoted by lS(β), i.e.,Pβ∈B lS(β) = L. Second,
let H−workers diﬀer in ability γ ∈ Γ = {γ1, ..., γJ}, 0 ≤ γ1 < ... < γJ < ∞. The
supply of type γ is denoted by hS(γ), i.e.,
P
γ∈Γ h
S(γ) = H.7
At the Þrm level, we distinguish between routine and non-routine tasks in the
production process of Þrms. The characterization of non-routine tasks rests on two
elements. First, workers assigned to non-routine tasks are more productive than those
6For instance, note that formal education levels are highly related to public education policy (either
by public scholling provision or by Þnancial aid for university attendants), which, for simplicity,
is treated as exogenous in our model. The human capital literature has identiÞed various factors
which are relevant for education decisions of individuals, e.g., credit constraints (Galor and Zeira,
1993), uncertainty (Levhari and Weiss, 1974; Gould et al., 2001) and social networks (Bénabou,
1996). Treating such factors as exogenous in an analysis of wage inequality, i.e., abstracting from
the educational attainment decision, follows e.g. Acemoglu (1998, 1999) and Thesmar and Thoenig
(2000), which focus on wage inequality across education groups.
7The few studies which control for measures of cognitive skills like scores from IQ and other
mental ability tests argue that - because of the high correlation between cognitive skills and education
levels - it is very diﬃcult to separate the earning eﬀects of cognitive ability from those of schooling
(e.g. Cawley et al., 2001). This evidence suggests that diﬀerences in cognitive skills are of limited
value to explain wage inequality within education groups (e.g. Heckman, 2000); Bowles et al., 2001).
Consistent with this hypothesis, recent evidence from the US Bureau of the Census (1998) suggests
that personal attributes like attitude and communication skills are much more important for the
hiring decisions of employers than years of schooling or academic performance.
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in routine tasks but costly in terms of non-production (e.g., managerial) labor. For
instance, performing non-routine production tasks require steady provision of infor-
mation by non-production workers about production processes, products, employers
goals, work procedures, customer feedbacks, legal regulations etc. We follow Porter
(1986) in using the term support activities for this kind of informal training provi-
sion. Thus, we refer to workers assigned to non-routine tasks as supported workers.
Second, we assume that abilities like analytical and social skills play a role only for
non-routine tasks, which captures in an extreme form that they are more important
than for routine tasks.8
Formally, let there be a unit mass of Þrms which produce a homogenous good in a
perfect market. Output yi of Þrm i is produced according to the linearly homogenous
function
yi = F
³ehi,eli´ ≡ elif (κi) , κi ≡ ehi/eli, (1)
(i.e., f (·) ≡ F (·, 1)), where ehi and eli denote eﬃciency units of H− and L−labor in
production, respectively, i.e., κi is the education-intensity of production labor. f(·) is a
strictly increasing and strictly concave function which fulÞlls the boundary conditions
lim
κ→∞
f 0(κ) = 0 and lim
κ→0+
f 0(κ) =∞. ehi and eli depend on the respective number of work-
ers assigned to routine and non-routine tasks, denoted by h1i , l
1
i and h
2
i , l
2
i , respectively,
and the within-group ability distribution of workers assigned to non-routine tasks in
Þrm i. Let li(β) be the number of L−workers in Þrm i with ability β when assigned
to non-routine tasks, i.e.,
l2i =
X
β∈B
li(β). (2)
To simplify the analysis, suppose thatH−workers are equally productive when assigned
to non-routinized production activities. That is, γ refers to the ability of H−workers
to provide support to production workers (when assigned as non-production worker),
8For instance, to solve some problem, a worker needs to gather information from co-workers, analyze
the siutation in a reasonable amount of time, and make the right decision. The information received
from non-production workers supports them in taking the right steps, but how a production worker
uses this information depends on his/her personal traits.
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as introduced shortly.9 Total eﬃciency units of production labor within Þrm i may
then be written as
ehi = h1i + h2i and eli = l1i + l2i , (3)
respectively, where
h2i = ah
2
i and l
2
i = b
X
β∈B
βli(β), (4)
are the eﬃciency units in non-routine tasks of H− and L−labor, respectively. Para-
meters a and b are related to productivity diﬀerences between non-routine and routine
labor. To capture that supported workers (h2, l2) have higher productivity than those
who are assigned to routine tasks (h1, l1) except, possibly, the least able L−workers,
suppose a > 1 and bβ > 1 for all β ∈ {β2, ..., βK}.10
A Þnal building block of our model is the support technology, reßecting the
organizational (support/training) eﬀort necessary to raise productivity of production
workers. To capture that these activities are intensive in educated labor, suppose for
simplicity that only H−workers can be assigned to these (non-routine) non-production
tasks. SpeciÞcally, in order to raise productivity of h2i and l
2
i workers (assigned to
non-routine tasks) with high and low education, respectively, Þrm i needs to employ
mi = G
¡
h2i , l
2
i
¢ ≡ l2i g (χi) , χi ≡ h2i /l2i , (5)
eﬃciency units of non-production (H−)labor, where G is a linearly homogeneous func-
tion. Note that the intensive form in (5) requires l2i > 0. We exclusively focus on this
case in the following (in order to avoid only mildly interesting borderline cases). χi is
the education-intensity of supported labor in Þrm i. Let g(·) be a strictly increasing and
9Alternatively, one may assume that unobservable abilities relevant for support tasks and produc-
tion activities, respectively, are strongly positively correlated (as plausible), and that H−workers with
a high level of such skills are more valuable for Þrms in support tasks. Such a modiÞcation would not
yield much additional insight but implies signiÞcant costs regarding the expositional simplicity of the
paper.
10The support activity may be time-consuming for employees. Implicitly, we assume that workers
receive wages during that time, i.e., Þrms bear the entire cost of providing informal training to workers.
Empirical evidence by Barron et al. (1999) indeed strongly supports this assumption.
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strictly convex function.11 That is, the support technology exhibits complementarities
among both types of labor (i.e., G12 < 0), in analogy to the standard assumption
that H− and L−labor are complements in the production technology F . (Note that
g00 (·) > 0 is equivalent to G12 < 0 under linear homogeneity of G.) Let mi be the
total amount of non-production labor and mi(γ) be the amount of type γ employed as
non-production worker in Þrm i, respectively, i.e.,
mi =
X
γ∈Γ
mi(γ). (6)
For a given amount mi, eﬃciency units mi depend on the ability distribution of γs
within Þrm i (e.g., reßecting diﬀerences in managerial ability) according to
mi =
X
γ∈Γ
γ mi(γ). (7)
Finally, suppose that wage costs for non-production labor are variable (rather than
Þxed) costs.12 This reßects the idea that providing support to production workers
assigned to non-routine tasks is an ongoing necessity, in contrast to one-shot formal
training programmes which improve workers human capital stock.
In sum, the model exhibits the minimum structure needed to examine the decision
of Þrms how to allocate workers with diﬀerent skills to diﬀerent tasks, taking into
account that non-production labor plays a major role in the organization of Þrms
and allowing for a second dimension of skill in addition to formal education. Stated
diﬀerently, the theoretical innovation of the model is to allow for a distinction between
a Tayloristic and a more Holistic organizational structure in Þrms, where the latter
11Thus, (5) may be viewed as joint production technology (e.g. Nadiri, 1987) with two outputs (h2i
and l2i ) and one input ( mi), which has a strictly decreasing and strictly concave transformation curve.
12As a consequence, hold-up problems, which are sometimes associated with Þrm-speciÞc training,
are not an issue in this context. For instance, as Batt (1999) points out, under new organizational
forms, ...learning ... is a continuous process of using new ideas and information as sources of
innovation (p. 541f.). [V]irtually all training and work related information (work procedures,
system capabilities, product information, legal regulations) are on-line; employees receive eight to ten
e-mail messages per day advising them of any updates in any of their systems (p. 558).
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is characterized by non-routine tasks which are more productive, but also more costly
(in terms of informal training provision) than routine tasks.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
This section provides the equilibrium analysis. After setting up the equilibrium condi-
tions, we derive comparative-static results regarding technology parameters a, b, and
changes in the supply of labor, H, L. This allows us to analyze the behavioral response
of Þrms to technology and factor supply conditions on the task composition of Þrms
and their impact on wage inequality within and between education groups.
First, it is plausible to argue that the introduction of ICT and advances in (human
resource) management techniques can be reßected by an increase in a and b (see (4)).
For instance, new ICT reduces the cost of lateral communication among workers and
increases the ability to process information (e.g. Radner, 1993; Lindbeck and Snower,
1996, 2000). Second, as well known, the share of educated workers has considerably
increased in most advanced countries over the last decades, which is reßected by an
increase in φ ≡ H/L in our model.13 Note that, at least for the 1970s, these education
supply shifts were not a response to an increasing college premium, which actually
decreased in the 1970s in the U.S. and remained fairly stable in Continental Europe
during the last few decades. Rather, consistent with our modelling strategy, it seems
plausible to interpret these shifts as being related to changes in exogenous factors like
the signiÞcant increases in Þnancial aid for college students in the U.S. and a surge in
public education facilities in Continental Europe. We exclusively focus on the case in
which the composition of analytical and social (i.e., typically unobservable) abilities
remain unchanged if labor supply changes. That is, hS(γ)/H, γ ∈ Γ, and lS(β)/L,
β ∈ B, remain constant if H or L changes. This assumption is consistent with the idea
13For instance, in the U.S., the share of workers with less than high-school declined from 29 percent
in 1970 to 19 percent in 1980 and 15 percent in 1990, whereas the share of workers with some college
increased from 32 to 42 and 46 percent in these years, respectively (Topel, 1997, Tab. 1). Similar
patterns have been observed in Continental Europe (e.g., see Edin and Holmlund, 1995, for Sweden
and Abraham and Houseman, 1995, for Germany).
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that unobservable ability and education are not (perfectly) related to each other.14
4.1 Equilibrium Conditions
Let w1h and w
1
l denote the wage rates of unsupported H− and L−labor assigned to
routinized production tasks, respectively, w2h the wage rate of supported H−labor in
modern production, and wm(γ) and wl(β) the wage rates of supporting labor of type
γ and supported L−labor of type β, respectively. According to (1)-(5) and (7), the
decision problem of Þrm i is given by
max
h1i ,l
1
i ,h
2
i ,
li(β),β∈B, mi(γ),γ∈Γ
F
Ã
h1i + ah
2
i , l
1
i + b
X
β∈B
βli (β)
!
− w1hh1i − w1l l1i − w2hh2i −
X
β∈B
wl (β) li (β)−
X
γ∈Γ
wm (γ) mi (γ) s.t.
X
γ∈Γ
γ mi (γ) = G
Ã
h2i ,
X
β∈B
li (β)
!
, (8)
and subject to non-negativity constraints.15 If l2i > 0, the Þrst-order conditions from
optimization problem (8) can be written as
f 0 (κi) = w1h, (9)
af 0 (κi) ≤ w2h + λig0 (χi) , (10)
f (κi)− κif 0 (κi) = w1l , (11)
bβ (f (κi)− κif 0 (κi)) ≤ wl (β) + λi (g (χi)− χig0 (χi)) , β ∈ B, (12)
λiγ ≤ wm (γ) , γ ∈ Γ, (13)
14Insofar as analytical and social skills are related to non-cognitive abilities, this is in line with
the empirical observation that education levels are highly correlated with cognitive but not with
non-cognitive abilities (e.g. Cawley et al., 2001).
15Implicitly, we assume that Þrms can perfectly screen workers with respect to abilities β and γ,
respectively, e.g., through job interviews and assessment centers.
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holding with equality if the relevant non-negativity constraint is binding.16 λi denotes
the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint in (8). The left-hand sides of
(9)-(12) are the marginal products of the respective types of labor, whereas the right-
hand sides are the marginal costs (which, for supported labor, also contain the costs
of non-production labor).
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium (and thus omit the Þrm index i from now
on).17 Full employment in equilibrium with a unit mass of Þrms then implies
h1 + h2 +m = H, l1 + l2 = L. (14)
Since H−labor assigned to production tasks is homogenous and the wage costs for
non-production H−workers are entirely born by Þrms, we have w1h = w2h ≡ wh in
equilibrium.18
Let the relative wage of labor in routine tasks, ω ≡ wh/w1l , be our measure of
between-group wage inequality.19 According to (9) and (11),
ω =
f 0 (κ)
f (κ)− κf 0 (κ) ≡ Ω(κ), (15)
where Ω0(κ) < 0. The following Þrst result emerges.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, there exist threshold ability levels eβ ∈ B and eγ ∈ Γ such
that the following holds.
(i) l (β) = lS (β) for all β > eβ, l(eβ) > 0, and l (β) = 0 for all β < eβ. Moreover,
16Note that (9) and (11) are equalities, according to the Inada conditions regarding f . Moreover,
(12) is binding at least for one β ∈ B under l2i > 0.
17As often the case in models with identical Þrms, it is conceivable that asymmetric equilibria
exist in addition to a symmetric one. However, note that κi = κ is directly implied by (9) or (11),
respectively. Also note that, due to the linear-homogeneity of functions F and G, Þrms make zero
proÞts in equilibrium.
18Moreover, as will become apparent below, the symmetric equilibrium is unique.
19We suppose h1 > 0 and l1 > 0 to focus on interior solutions (which is the empirically relevant
case). In fact, if the majority of less educated workers still holds traditional jobs and the majority of
educated labor are production workers (as plausible for the time periods which most empirical studies
about the evolution of wage inequality have considered), ω represents the relative median wage of
educated labor.
11
wl(β)/w
1
l = b(β − eβ) + 1 for all β ≥ eβ if l(eβ) < lS(eβ), whereas l(eβ) = lS(eβ) implies
wl(eβ) ≥ w1l and, with γ ≥ eγ,
bβ =
wl(β)
w1l
+
wm(γ)
wh
ω
g (χ)− χg0 (χ)
γ
for all β ≥ β. (16)
(ii) m (γ) = hS (γ) for all γ > eγ, m (eγ) > 0, and m (γ) = 0 for all γ < eγ. Moreover,
wm(eγ) = wh and wm(γ)/wh = γ/eγ for all γ ≥ eγ if m (eγ) < hS (eγ), whereas m (eγ) =
hS (eγ) implies wm(eγ) ≥ wh and
a = 1+
wm(γ)
wh
g0 (χ)
γ
for all γ ≥ eγ. (17)
Proof. See appendix.
Part (i) of Lemma 1 states that L−workers are supported (i.e., are assigned to
non-routine tasks) up to a threshold level eβ in the ability distribution of β, whereas
those with ability lower than eβ are assigned to routine tasks. L−workers with ability
above threshold eβ earn a wage premium (i.e., wl(β)/w1l = b(β − eβ) + 1 > 1 for all
β > eβ), whereas wl(eβ) = w1l if L−workers of type eβ are not a scarce resource (i.e.,
if l(eβ) < lS(eβ)). If l(eβ) = lS(eβ), however, then wl(eβ) > w1l typically holds (besides
in a knife-edge case). Similarly, H−workers with ability γ ≥ eγ are assigned to non-
production tasks, and always earn a wage premium (as wm(γ)/wh = γ/eγ for all γ ≥ eγ)
if ability γ exceeds threshold ability eγ. (Also the remainder of part (ii) of Lemma 1 is
analogous to part (i)).
Let within-group wage inequality be measured by relative wages of workers assigned
to non-routinized jobs, wm (γ) /wh, γ ≥ eγ, and wl (β) /w1l , β ≥ eβ, respectively.20 Thus,
(16) and (17) jointly give us a relationship between within-group wage inequality and
between-group wage inequality (measured by ω). In particular, within-group inequality
20Suppose that suﬃcient shares of workers in the economy are in Tayloristic and modern jobs
within each education group, respectively, and the β−, γ−abilities are suﬃciently dispersed. Then
these inequality measures correspond for some particular ability type to the 90-10 wage diﬀerential
within an education group. This measure is often used in empirical studies (e.g. Katz and Autor,
1999),
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and between-group inequality may be negatively related. The left-hand side of (16) is
the productivity of a supported L−worker with ability β relative to that of a L−worker
in a routinized job, whereas the right-hand side is the respective relative cost. This
relative cost consists of four (endogenous) components: within-group relative wage
wl(β)/w
1
l of a L−worker of type β, within-group relative wage wm(γ)/wh of a non-
production (H−)worker of type γ, between-group relative wage ω, and the marginal
physical cost of a H−worker with ability γ to support L−workers.21 Similarly, the left-
hand side of (17) is the relative productivity of a supported H−worker, whereas the
right-hand side is the respective relative cost. The latter consists of three components:
the relative wage of a supported H−worker in production (which equals unity since
w1h = w
2
h = wh), within-group relative wage wm(γ)/wh of a non-production worker of
type γ, and the marginal physical cost of such a H−worker.
Lemma 1 also indicates that there are potential diﬀerences regarding within-group
wage inequality between scenarios with l(eβ) < lS(eβ) (i.e., not all L−workers with
threshold ability eβ are supported) or m (eγ) < hS (eγ), and scenarios with l(eβ) = lS(eβ)
or m (eγ) = hS (eγ), respectively. This plays an important role for the comparative-static
analysis presented in the next subsection.
4.2 Comparative-statics
According to Lemma 1, there are four possible scenarios for which we can study the
marginal impact of changes in relative labor supply φ = H/L (holding the composition
of abilities constant) and technology shifts, reßected by changes in a or b:
1.) l(eβ) < lS(eβ) and m (eγ) < hS (eγ),
2.) l(eβ) = lS(eβ) and m (eγ) < hS (eγ),
3.) l(eβ) = lS(eβ) and m (eγ) = hS (eγ), and
4.) l(eβ) < lS(eβ) and m (eγ) = hS (eγ).
Lemma 2 Comparative-static results for scenarios 1-4 are as shown in Table 1.
21Note that we decomposed wm(γ)/w1l into (wm(γ)/wh)× ω (recall ω = wh/w1l ).
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Proof. See appendix.
<Please insert Table 1 about here>
The remainder of this section discusses the intuition of Lemma 2 and derives im-
plications. We start with changes in the relative supply of educated labor, φ.
4.2.1 Relative Supply of Educated Labor
According to Tab. 1, whenever l(eβ) < lS(eβ) (i.e., scenarios 1 and 4), l(eβ)/L is strictly
increasing in the relative supply of H−labor, φ = H/L. That is, an increase in φ
induces Þrms to restructure in the sense that a higher share of the L−labor force
is assigned to non-Tayloristic jobs. Moreover, for a certain range of relative supply
φ, Þrms may choose not to support workers from a low-ability group, even though
all workers from an adjacent group with higher ability β is already assigned to non-
routinized jobs. Before discussing the intuition of these results, note that this implies
following corollary.
Corollary 1 For any k = 2, ..., K, there exist φk1, φ
k
2, φ
k
3, with 0 < φ
k
1 < φ
k
2 < φ
k
3 and
φk−11 = φ
k
3, such that
(i) eβ = βk for all φ ∈ (φk1, φk3] and eβ < βk for all φ > φk3,
(ii) l(eβ) < lS(β) for all φ ∈ (φk1, φk2) and l(eβ) = lS(β) for all φ ≥ φk2.
<Please insert Figure 1 about here>
Thus, according to Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Corollary 1, our measure of wage in-
equality within the group of L−workers for a particular ability type βk > eβ, wl(βk)/w1l ,
evolves with increasing relative supply of H−workers, φ, as shown in Fig. 1. The next
result is thus immediately implied by the preceding ones.
Proposition 1 (Within-group wage inequality and education). (i) Wage inequality
within the group of L−workers is a non-decreasing (and continuous) function of φ =
H/L, and strictly increasing in φ over some ranges. (ii) The impact of an increase in
φ on wage inequality within the group of H−workers is ambiguous.
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Let us start with a discussion of part (i) of Proposition 1. The crucial insight is
that an increase in φ raises the incentive of Þrms to reallocate L−labor towards non-
routinized production tasks, i.e., training of L−workers becomes more attractive. To
see this, suppose this would not be the case. Then an increase in φ unambiguously
raises education-intensity of production labor, κ = eh/el. Thus, all other things equal,
between-group relative wage ω declines, according to (15). Ceteris paribus, this reduces
the relative marginal costs to support L−workers (since this is intensive in H−labor),
which is given by the right-hand side of (16). This gives Þrms an incentive to support
a higher share of L−workers and thus raises the demand for β−abilities. Thus, for
given within-group wage inequality (i.e., as long as l(eβ)/L < lS(eβ)/L, given threshold
ability level eβ), l(eβ)/L will rise (scenarios 1 and 4 in Tab. 1). However, as soon as
l(eβ) = lS(eβ) is reached (at some φ2 in Fig. 1), a further marginal increase in φ does
not make support of workers with lower ability than, say, βk = eβ attractive (scenarios
2 and 3).22 In this case, rising demand for all types β ≥ βk meets Þxed supply
such that wl(eβ)/w1l rises with φ. At some level of wage inequality wl(eβ)/w1l , assigning
L−labor with ability βk−1 < βk to non-routine tasks becomes attractive as φ increases
so that eβ falls to βk−1.23 (Then we again start from scenario 1 or 4.)
Interestingly, regarding part (ii) of Proposition 1, the impact of an increase in φ
on m (γ) /H and wm (γ) /wh, respectively, is less clear. This is due to our assumptions
that non-routine tasks require educated labor for support and H−individuals diﬀer
in the ability to provide such support. To see this, Þrst, note that between-group
relative wage ω does not enter equation (17), which equates the relative beneÞt and
relative costs of assigning H−workers to non-routine rather than routine production
tasks. According to the previous discussion, an increase in φ raises the incentive to
assign L−labor towards non-routinized jobs. This increases the non-production labor
requirement for provision of support. Thus, if l(eβ)/L gradually increases with φ, then
there are two possibilities. Either m (eγ) /H rises without raising wm (γ) /wh, γ ≥ eγ,
22In terms of Corollary 1 and Fig. 1, respectively, given that eβ = βk, scenarios 1 or 4 apply if φ
rises in the interval (φk1 , φ
k
2), whereas scenarios 2 or 3 apply if φ rises in the interval [φ
k
2 , φ
k
3).
23At this point, wl(β
k)/w1l = b(β
k − βk−1) + 1, according to Lemma 1.
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which occurs as long as m (eγ) /H < hS (eγ) /H (i.e., H−workers of type eγ are not scarce
yet) or wm (γ) /wh rises for all γ ≥ eγ. (These possibilities refer to scenarios 1 or 4,
respectively.) Moreover, as long as l(eβ)/L increases with φ for given eβ, then threshold
ability level eγ may fall after an increase in φ from, say, type γj to γj−1. To the contrary,
if l(eβ) = lS(eβ), then an increase in φ does not raise demand for γ−abilities. On the one
hand, if m (eγ) /H < hS (eγ) /H, then an even lower share of non-production workers is
needed to support the same fraction l2/L of L−labor after a marginal increase in φ, i.e.,
m (eγ) /H declines (scenario 2). On the other hand, if m (eγ) = hS (eγ), the reduction
in demand for γ−abilities after a marginal increase in φ is reßected by a decline in
wm (γ) /wh, γ ≥ eγ (scenario 3). However, whenever m/H does not decline after a
(marginal or non-marginal) increase in φ, then wage inequality within the group of
H−labor does not decrease and, possibly, increases.
In sum, Proposition 1 is consistent with the empirical Þndings discussed in sections
1 and 2 that both overall within-group wage inequality and the share of workers as-
signed to non-Tayloristic jobs have risen, that these developments were accompanied
by increased training provision within Þrms and that the observed increase in the rel-
ative supply of educated labor seemed to have a signiÞcant impact on restructuring of
Þrms towards knowledge-based organizational forms.
At the same time, however, many countries have experienced stagnating or even
declining between-group wage inequality.24 To address this fact, we now investigate
the impact of an increase in φ = H/L on ω = wh/w1l .
Proposition 2 (Between-group wage inequality and education). Between-group wage
inequality is a non-increasing function of φ = H/L.
For the intuition of the φ-eﬀect on ω = wh/w1l we consider two diﬀerent cases
suggested by Table 1. First, if l(eβ) < lS(eβ) and m (eγ) /H < hS (eγ) /H simultaneously
hold (scenario 1), a marginal increase in φ raises the share of L−labor assigned to
non-routinized jobs (as argued above). This stimulates demand for non-production
24In particular, this applies to Continental European countries, but also the the U.S. in the 1970s.
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workers, thereby raising m/H. Both the implied reallocation of H−labor away from
production and the increase in eﬃciency units of L−labor reduce education-intensity of
production labor κ = eh/el. This is a counteracting eﬀect of an increase in φ on κ.25 In
sum, both κ and thus between-group wage inequality ω remain unaﬀected.26 Second,
if one of the two conditions l(eβ) ≤ lS(eβ) and m (eγ) ≤ hS (eγ) is binding, a marginal
increase in φ reduces (scenario 2) or does not aﬀect (scenarios 3 and 4) the share of
non-production workers in the total supply of H−labor. This gives rise to a positive
impact of an increase in φ on κ and, therefore, reduces ω, according to (15).
Taken together, Propositions 1 and 2 demonstrate that within-group wage inequal-
ity and between-group wage inequality can be adversely related, given the same factor
supply shock.27 However, an increase in φ alone cannot explain the Anglo-American
experience of rising wage inequality within and between groups in the 1980s and most
of the 1990s. To address this fact, we now turn to the impact of technological change.
4.2.2 New Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)
Most of the literature on the relationship between wage inequality and technological
change has focussed on biased changes in the production technology, in the sense of an
(exogenous or endogenous) increase in marginal productivity of educated relative to less
educated labor.28 In contrast, we consider a kind of technological change which raises
the productivity gain from allocating workers towards non-routine jobs, represented by
25Note that such a counteracting eﬀect is absent in a conventional model which does not distinguish
between production-related tasks on the one hand and non-production tasks on the other hand.
26The eﬀects regarding ω and the allocation of labor in scenario 1 are similar to those discussed
in Egger and Grossmann (2005), in which, however, we did not allow for within-group heterogeneity.
Thus, scenarios 2-4 could not occur in this model.
27Typically, the (still rare) literature which allows for both between-group and within-group wage
inequality does not acount for this possibility. A notable exception is the paper by Gould et. al. (2001),
in which an increasing variance of the rate of technological progress across sectors raises residual wage
inequality but, at the same time, depresses the education premium.
28In our model, this could be reßected by an increase in F1/F2 (for any given education-intensity
κ). It has been established in a series of papers (focussing on diﬀerent kinds of models and questions)
that, somewhat surprisingly, such skill-biased technology change has an ambiguous eﬀects on between-
group wage inequality if one allows for some skill-intensive, productivity-enhancing technology like (5).
Moreover, in such a model, biased technological change of this sort counterfactually leads to a decline
in the non-production employment share. See also Grossmann (2002), Falkinger and Grossmann
(2003) and Egger and Grossmann (2005) for these kinds of reasoning.
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shifts in a and b in our model.
An increase in a raises the relative productivity of supported H−workers in pro-
duction (h2), according to (17), and thus has a positive eﬀect on the demand for
non-production activities. This raises either the share of non-production workers in
total supply of H−labor, m/H (scenarios 1 and 2) or wm(eγ)/w1h for all γ ≥ eγ (scenar-
ios 3 and 4). Thus, the impact of an increase in a on within-group wage inequality of
H−labor is completely analogous to the impact of an increase in φ on that of L−labor
(which is depicted in Fig. 1). Regarding between-group wage inequality, ω, however,
the eﬀect of a higher a is less clear-cut (i.e., is positive in scenario 1 but negative oth-
erwise). The reason is that, holding everything else constant, a is positively related
to the education-intensity of production labor, κ = eh/el (which in turn is negatively
related to ω), according to (3) and (4).29
To the contrary, an increase in b raises ω in all scenarios, but the eﬀects on within-
group wage inequality are more ambiguous. First, a higher b has a direct negative
eﬀect on κ (analogous to the direct positive eﬀect of a on κ), which ultimately gives
rise to an increase in between-group wage inequality ω in all four scenarios. Second,
since an increase in b raises the productivity of L−workers in non-routine relative to
those in routine tasks, demand for β−abilities of L−labor is raised, all other things
equal. However, an increase in ω is associated with an increase in the marginal cost of
support activity, according to (16), and therefore reduces the demand for β−abilities.
This counteracts the aforementioned eﬀect, leaving the impact of an increase in b on
within-group wage inequality wl (β) /w1l , β ≥ eβ, generally ambiguous. The impact of
an increase in b on wl (β) /w1l , β ≥ eβ, is only unambiguously positive if l(eβ) < lS(eβ)
(scenarios 1 and 4). We can thus conclude that the following robust relationships hold.
Proposition 3 (Wage inequality and advances in ICT). (i) Within-group wage in-
29Only in scenario 1 in which a marginal increase in a induces a reallocation of workers towards non-
routine jobs in both education groups, ω = wh/w1l rises. This is because, as is intuitive, an increase in
a raises the education-intensity of supported labor, χ = h2/l2 (formally shown in the proof of Lemma
2). In turn, this lowers the marginal costs to support L−workers since g00(·) > 0. Hence, relative
demand for non-production workers rises. Since wm(eγ) = wh in scenario 1, according to Lemma 1, ω
rises despite the fact that a is positively related to κ for a given allocation of labor.
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equality of H−workers is a non-decreasing (and continuous) function of a, and strictly
increasing in a over some ranges. (ii) Between-group wage inequality is strictly in-
creasing in b.
In sum, we may conclude that technological changes which raise a and b simulta-
neously (and thus raise the incentive of Þrms to reassign workers to non-Tayloristic
tasks) can explain both rising inequality within the group of educated workers and
rising between-group wage inequality.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has argued that both rising relative supply of educated labor and techno-
logical change has led to restructuring processes within Þrms which raised the demand
for typically (to empirical researchers) unobservable abilities like analytical and social
skills. The contribution of our paper is to propose a theory on equilibrium responses
of Þrms to changing technology and factor supply conditions in allocating labor to
routine and non-routine tasks, and to analyze their implications for skill prices within
and across education groups. Our model rests on the hypotheses that (i) a realloca-
tion of labor towards non-routine tasks is productivity-enhancing but costly in terms
of training provision, (ii) analytical and social ability is more relevant for performing
non-routine tasks, and (iii) organizational (e.g. human resource management) activity
within Þrms is skill-intensive. Our results are not only consistent with empirical evi-
dence on a pervasive rise in within-group wage inequality and possibly stagnating or
falling wage dispersion between education groups, but also contribute to an understand-
ing of why these developments occurred at the same time as Þrms reorganized work
towards non-Tayloristic jobs throughout the developed world. In fact, the empirical
literature on skill-biased technological change (e.g., Berman et al., 1994; Bresnahan,
1999; Bresnahan et al., 2002) has always pointed out that understanding changes in
the demand for skills requires to take into account restructuring processes within Þrms.
However, surprisingly little theoretical work has been done in this area so far.
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An important and still ongoing debate in the context of wage inequality is why the
education premium in Continental Europe evolved so diﬀerently as opposed to the US
and UK. Although relative supply of educated labor has increased considerably during
the last few decades in basically all advanced countries, one center of this debate has
been whether diﬀerences in skill supply growth rates across countries or institutional
diﬀerences is the main reason for rather stable education premia in Europe and sharply
rising ones (at least in the 1980s and most of the 1990s) in the U.S. (e.g., Gottschalk and
Smeeding, 1997). In a well-recognized paper, Blau and Kahn (1996) Þnd no evidence in
favor of market forces to reconcile these diﬀerent wage patterns (under the hypothesis
of similar technology-induced changes in the labor demand composition across coun-
tries), based on the years of schooling as a measure of skill. However, as pointed out by
Acemoglu (2002), the institutional view cannot explain why unemployment rates have
risen almost proportionally for educated and less educated workers (Nickell and Bell,
1996, 1997). A recent paper by Leuven et al. (2004) is capable to reconcile this con-
ßicting evidence. By constructing internationally comparable measures of skill, they
Þnd that up to 60 percent of the variation in skill wage diﬀerential is explained by
relative net supply (Leuven et al., 2004, p. 482), diametrical to the Þndings by Blau
and Kahn.30 Insofar as skill supply shifts can be viewed as exogenous events (e.g., sig-
niÞcantly aﬀected by public policy), this is consistent with our analysis.31 In addition,
our model can explain why, at the same time, both within-group wage inequality and
the organizational set up in Þrms has changed also in Continental Europe.
Our Þnal remark is a tentative policy conclusion. Our model has emphasized the role
of unobserved heterogeneity for both observed wage patterns and the incentive of Þrms
to restructure towards organizational forms which require analytical and interactive
30Leuven et al. (2004) are capable of reproducing the Þndings of Blau and Kahn (1996) within their
data set by employing years of schooling as skill measure, suggesting that results are very sensitive to
the skill measure used.
31This is not to deny that also institutional factors (e.g., like strong unions or minimum wages)
have contributed to stagnating education premia in Continental Europe. What it means, as pointed
by Leuven et al. (2004, p. 484), is that the relative contribution of institutions and market forces
are, however, still unknown. Our model has abstracted from labor market institutions to focus on
market forces.
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abilities. In other words, shortage of such skills may be an impediment for Þrms
to enhance productivity and may be the major source of low earnings individually,
partly irrespective of formal education. In fact, as argued by Heckman (2000), labor
market programmes aiming at raising qualiÞcations of workers often turn out to be
almost ineﬀective to boost earning prospects due to the lack of social skills. Our model
suggests that this problem may require an increased emphasis on social abilities in
high-school education or even earlier in order to reverse inequality trends.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Perfect competition in the labor market implies that 0 < l(β) < lS(β) (0 < m(γ) <
hS(γ)) is only consistent with an equilibrium if wl(β) = w1l , β ∈ B (wm(γ) = wh,
γ ∈ Γ). Hence, it is an immediate consequence of proÞt maximization that 0 < l(eβ) ≤
lS(eβ) (0 < m (eγ) ≤ hS (eγ)) requires l (β) = lS (β) for all β > eβ ( m (γ) = hS (γ) for all
γ > eγ) and l (β) = 0 for all β < eβ ( m (γ) = 0 for all γ > eγ). Moreover, note from (13)
that λ = wm (γ) /γ for all γ ≥ eγ. Thus, (11) and (12) imply for all β ≥ eβ and γ ≥ eγ
that
bβw1l = wl (β) +
wm (γ)
γ
(g (χ)− χg0 (χ)) , (A.1)
whereas (9) and (10) imply
awh = wh +
wm (γ)
γ
g0 (χ) (A.2)
for all γ ≥ eγ. Equations (16) and (17) follow from (A.1), (A.2) and deÞnition ω =
wh/w
1
l . Moreover, using the facts that wl(eβ) = w1l if l(eβ) < lS(eβ) and wm(eγ) = wh
if m (eγ) < hS (eγ), (A.1) and (A.2) conÞrm wl(β)/w1l = β − eβ + 1 for all β ≥ eβ and
wm(γ)/wh = γ/eγ for all γ ≥ eγ, respectively. However, note that wl(eβ) > w1l and
wm(eγ) > wh is possible if l(eβ) = lS(eβ) and m (eγ) = hS (eγ), respectively, since threshold
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ability types are a scarce resource in this case. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2
First, note that using eh2 = ah2, (3), (14) and χ = h2/l2, κ = eh2/el2 can be written as
κ =
h1 + eh2
l1 + el2 = φ
¡
1− m
H
¢
+ (a− 1)χ l2
L
1− l2
L
+
!l2
L
(A.3)
(recall φ = H/L). Also note that Lemma 1 implies
l2 =
X
β>!β
lS (β) + l(eβ), (A.4)
el2 = b
X
β>!β
βlS (β) + eβl(eβ)
 , (A.5)
m =
X
γ>!γ h
S (γ) + m (eγ) , (A.6)
em = X
γ>!γ γm
S (γ) + eγ m (eγ) , (A.7)
according to (2), (4), (6), (7). We now explore comparative-static eﬀects for scenarios
1-4 separately.
Ad scenario 1: Recall from Lemma 1 that l(eβ) < lS(eβ) and m (eγ) < hS (eγ) imply
wl(β)/w
1
l = b(β− eβ)+ 1 for all β ≥ eβ and wm(γ)/wh = γ/eγ for all γ ≥ eγ, respectively,
thus conÞrming our results for within-group inequality. Moreover, recall wl(eβ) = w1l
and wm(eγ) = wh. Thus, (A.1) and (A.2) imply that (g (χ)− χg0 (χ))ω = (beβ − 1)eγ
and
g0 (χ) = (a− 1)eγ ⇐⇒ χ = (g0)−1 ((a− 1)eγ) ≡ eχ( a
(+)
), (A.8)
respectively, where eχ(a) is increasing in a. Thus,
ω =
(beβ − 1)eγ
[g (χ)− χg0(χ)]χ=!χ(a) ≡ eω( a(+), b(+)), (A.9)
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where ∂eω/∂a > 0,32 ∂eω/∂b > 0 and ∂eω/∂φ = 0. Using ω = Ω(κ), according to (15), we
Þnd that κ = Ω−1(eω(a, b)) ≡ eκ(a, b), where ∂eκ/∂a < 0 and ∂eκ/∂b < 0, since Ω0(κ) < 0,
and ∂eκ/∂φ = 0 . Also note that combining l2 = m/g (χ) from (5) with (A.4) and
(A.7), and rearranging terms, yields
l(eβ)
L
=
φ
³P
γ>!γ γ hS(γ)H + eγ m(!γ)H ´
g (χ)
−
X
β>!β
lS (β)
L
. (A.10)
Substituting (A.4)-(A.6) into (A.3) and then using (A.8) and (A.10) yields
1− [1− η(eχ(a))] m(!γ)
H
+
P
γ>!γ
³
η(eχ(a))γ!γ − 1´ hS(γ)H
1
φ
+ b
!β−1
g(!χ(a))
³P
γ>!γ γ hS(γ)H + eγ m(!γ)H ´+ bφPβ>!β(β − eβ) lS(β)L − eκ(a, b) = 0, (A.11)
where η(χ) ≡ χg0 (χ) /g (χ), χ = eχ(a) and κ = eκ(a, b) have been used. (A.11) de-
Þnes m (eγ) /H implicitly as function of (a, b, φ). Comparative-static results regarding
m (eγ) /H follow from applying the implicit function theorem to (A.11) and observing
the properties of eχ(a) and eκ(a, b).33
For the results regarding l(eβ)/L, note that combining (5) with (A.7) yields
m (eγ)
H
=
g (eχ(a))eγφ l2L −X
γ>!γ
γeγ hS (γ)H . (A.12)
Next, substitute (A.5), (A.6) and (A.8) into (A.3) and use both χ = eχ(a) and (A.12)
to obtain
κ =
φ
³
1+
P
γ>!γ
³
γ!γ − 1
´
hS(γ)
H
´
− 1!γ [g (χ)− χg0 (χ)]χ=!χ(a) l2L
1− l2
L
+ b
P
β>!β β lS(β)L + beβ lS(!β)L . (A.13)
32Use the fact that [g (χ)− χg0 (χ)] is strictly decreasing in χ together with the properties of eχ(a).
33Recall that lS (β) /L, β > eβ, and mS (γ) /H, γ > eγ, are not aﬀected by φ by the assumption of
constant within-group compositions of abilities β and γ, respectively. Moreover, note that η0(χ) > 0
since g (χ)− χg0 (χ) > 0 and g00 (χ) > 0.
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Finally, substitute (A.4) into (A.13) and use κ = eκ(a, b) which leads to
φ
h
1+
P
γ>!γ γ−!γ!γ m(!γ)H
i
m(!γ)
H
− 1!γ l2L [g (χ)− χg0(χ)]χ=!χ(a)
1+
P
β>!β (bβ − 1) lS(β)L +
³
beβ − 1´ l(!β)
L
− eκ(a, b) = 0. (A.14)
(A.14) deÞnes l(eβ)/L implicitly as function of (a, b, φ). Comparative-static results
regarding l(eβ)/L follow from applying the implicit function theorem to (A.14) and,
again, observing the properties of eχ(a) and eκ(a, b).
Ad scenario 2: First, note that m (eγ) < hS (eγ) implies that wm(γ)/wh = γ/eγ for all
γ ≥ eγ, thus conÞrming our results regarding inequality within the group ofH−workers.
Moreover, (A.8) still holds. Also note that l(eβ) = lS(eβ) implies that l2/L is constant,
according to (A.4). Thus, using (A.12) conÞrms the results regarding m (eγ) /H. Next,
use l(eβ) = lS(eβ) in (A.13) and recall eχ0(a) > 0 to conÞrm that κ is strictly increasing in
both a and φ, and strictly decreasing in b. Using ω = Ω(κ) with Ω0(κ) < 0, according
to (15), conÞrms the results regarding ω. Finally, use these results and substitute
χ = eχ(a) from (A.8) into (16) to conÞrm the results regarding wl (β) /w1l , β > eβ.
Ad scenario 3: First, note that l(eβ) = lS(eβ) implies that l2/L is constant andel2/L =
b
P
β≥!β βlS (β) /L, according to (A.4) and (A.5), respectively. Similarly, m (eγ) = hS (eγ)
implies thatm/H is constant and em/H =Pγ≥!γ γmS (γ), according to (A.6) and (A.7),
respectively. Thus, em = l2g (χ) implies that
χ = g−1
Ã
φ
P
γ>!γ γmS (γ) /H
l2/L
!
≡ eeχ( φ
(+)
), (A.15)
where eeχ(φ) is increasing in φ. Substituting both el2/L = bPβ≥!β βlS (β) /L and (A.15)
into (A.3) leads to
κ =
φ
¡
1− m
H
¢
+ (a− 1) eeχ(φ) l2
L
1− l2
L
+ b
P
β≥!β β lS(β)L
≡ eeκ( a
(+)
, b
(−)
, φ
(+)
). (A.16)
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Thus, eeκ(a, b, φ) is increasing in a and φ, and decreasing in b. Noting that ω =
Ω(eeκ(a, b, φ)) ≡ eeω(a, b, φ) from (15) conÞrms the results regarding ω. Moreover, sub-
stituting χ = eeχ(φ) and ω = eeω(a, b, φ) into (16) and observing functional properties
conÞrms our results for wl (β) /w1l , β ≥ eβ. Similarly, substituting χ = eeχ(φ) into (17)
conÞrms the results regarding wm (γ) /wh, γ ≥ eγ.
Ad scenario 4: First, note that l(eβ) < lS(eβ) implies wl(β)/w1l = b(β−eβ)+ 1 for all
β ≥ eβ, thus conÞrming our results regarding inequality within the group of L−workers.
Substituting (A.4) and (A.7) into em = l2g (χ) from (5) and observing m (eγ) = hS (eγ)
implies that
χ = g−1
 φPγ≥!γ γ hS(γ)HP
β>!β lS(β)L + l(!β)L
 ≡ XÃl(eβ)/L
(−)
, φ
(+)
!
, (A.17)
where X
³
l(eβ)/L, φ´ is decreasing in l(eβ)/L, and increasing in φ. Next, recall that
l(eβ) < lS(eβ) implies wl(eβ) = w1l , i.e.,
ω =
beβ − 1
a− 1
g0 (χ)
g (χ)− χg0 (χ) , (A.18)
according to (A.1). Combining (A.18) with ω = Ω(κ) from (15) yields the relationship
κ = Ω−1
Ã
beβ − 1
a− 1
g0 (χ)
g (χ)− χg0 (χ)
!
≡ K( χ
(−)
, a
(+)
, b
(−)
), (A.19)
where K(χ, a, b) is decreasing in both χ and b, and increasing in a. Now, substituting
l2 =
³P
γ≥!γ γmS (γ)
´
/g (χ) into the numerator of (A.3) as well as substituting both
(A.4) and (A.5) into the denominator of (A.3) yields
κ =
φ
h
1− m
H
+ (a−1)χ
g(χ)
P
γ≥!γ γ hS(γ)H
i
1+
P
β>!β (bβ − 1) lS(β)L +
³
beβ − 1´ l(!β)
L
. (A.20)
Observing (A.17) and (A.19) then leads to
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0 = K
Ã
X
Ã
l(eβ)
L
, φ
!
, a, b
!1+X
β>!β
(bβ − 1) l
S (β)
L
+
³
beβ − 1´ l(eβ)
L
−
φ
1− m
H
+
(a− 1)X
³
l(!β)
L
, φ
´
g
³
X
³
l(!β)
L
, φ
´´ X
γ≥!γ γ
hS (γ)
H
 . (A.21)
Note that m (eγ) = hS (eγ) implies that m/H is constant, according to (A.6). Thus,
(A.21) gives us l(eβ)/L implicitly as function of (a, b, φ). Hence, observing the properties
of functions X
³
l(eβ)/L, φ´ and K(χ, a, b) conÞrms the results regarding l(eβ)/L.34
We now turn to wage inequality. First, note that combining m (eγ) = hS (eγ) and
(A.10) implies l(eβ)/L = φ³Pγ≥!γ γmS (γ) /H´ /g (χ) −Pβ>!β lS (β) /L. Substituting
this expression into (A.20), and using κ = K(χ, a, b) from (A.19), leads to
1− m
H
+ (a−1)χ
g(χ)
P
γ≥!γ γ hS(γ)H
1
φ
+ b
!β−1
g(χ)
P
γ≥!γ γ hS(γ)H + bφPβ>!β(β − eβ) lS(β)L −K (χ, a, b) = 0. (A.22)
Thus, (A.22) gives us χ implicitly as function of (a, b, φ). Hence, observing ∂K(χ, a, b)/∂χ <
0 reveals that χ is a decreasing function of φ.35 (Moreover, it is easy to check that
changes in a or b aﬀect χ in an ambiguous way.) According to (A.18), this implies
that ω decreases with φ, while within-group wage inequality wm (γ) /wh for all γ ≥ eγ
increases in φ, according to (17).
Next, we conÞrm that ω decreases with a. First, suppose χ is non-increasing in
a. In this case, κ = K(χ, a, b) is increasing in a because of ∂K(χ, a, b)/∂χ < 0 and
∂K(χ, a, b)/∂a > 0. Thus, since (15) implies ω = Ω(κ) with Ω0(κ) < 0, ω is decreasing
in a if χ is non-increasing in a. Now suppose to the contrary that χ is increasing in
a. In this case, (A.22) imposes ∂κ/∂a > 0 and thus, ∂ω/∂a < 0, according to (15). In
sum, we have shown that whatever the sign of ∂χ/∂a is, ∂ω/∂a < 0.
In a similar fashion, we can show that ∂ω/∂b > 0. First, suppose χ is non-decreasing
34Note that χ/g (χ) is strictly increasing in χ since g (χ)− χg0 (χ) > 0.
35Note that this is no contradiction to (A.17) since l(eβ)/L increases with φ in scenario 4.
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in b. In this case, κ = K(χ, a, b) is decreasing in b because of ∂K(χ, a, b)/∂χ < 0 and
∂K(χ, a, b)/∂b < 0. Thus, since ω = Ω(κ) with Ω0(κ) < 0, ω is increasing in b if χ is
non-decreasing in b. Now suppose to the contrary that χ is decreasing in b. In this
case, (A.22) imposes ∂κ/∂b < 0 and thus, ∂w/∂b > 0, according to (15). In sum, we
have shown that whatever the sign of ∂χ/∂b is, ∂ω/∂b > 0.
Finally, we show that wm (γ) /wh is increasing in a for all γ ≥ eγ. To see this, Þrst,
solve (A.18) for (a−1)/g0 (χ) and substitute the resulting expression into (17) to obtain
wm (γ)
wh
=
γ(beβ − 1)
ω [g (χ)− χg0 (χ)] , γ ≥ eγ (A.23)
Suppose that χ is increasing in a. Then ∂ω/∂a < 0 and g00 (χ) > 0 unambiguously
imply that wm (γ) /wh is increasing in a for all γ ≥ eγ, according to (A.23). Now
suppose to the contrary that χ is non-increasing in a. According to (17), also in this
case wm (γ) /wh is increasing in a for all γ ≥ eγ. (The impact of an increase in b on
inequality within the group of H−workers, however, is ambiguous, since its impact on
χ is ambiguous.) This concludes the proof. ¥
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Table 1. Comparative-static results (marginal eﬀects)
Scenario 1: l(eβ) < lS(eβ) and m (eγ) < hS (eγ)
l(!β)
L
m(!γ)
H
ω wl(β)
w1l
, β ≥ eβ wm(γ)
wh
, γ ≥ eγ
φ + + 0 0 0
a + + + 0 0
b +, 0,− +, 0,− + + 0
Scenario 2: l(eβ) = lS(eβ) and m (eγ) < hS (eγ)
m(!γ)
H
ω wl(β)
w1l
, β ≥ eβ wm(γ)
wh
, γ ≥ eγ
φ − − + 0
a + − + 0
b 0 + +, 0,− 0
Scenario 3: l(eβ) = lS(eβ) and m (eγ) = hS (eγ)
ω wl(β)
w1l
, β ≥ eβ wm(γ)
wh
, γ ≥ eγ
φ − + −
a − +, 0,− +
b + +, 0,− 0
Scenario 4: l(eβ) < lS(eβ) and m (eγ) = hS (eγ)
l(!β)
L
ω wl(β)
w1l
, β ≥ eβ wm(γ)
wh
, γ ≥ eγ
φ + − 0 +
a +, 0,− − 0 +
b +, 0,− + + +, 0,−
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Figure 1: Wage dispersion within the group of L-workers 
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